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Abstract
We introduce a novel beauty contest experiment to study the gap between individual
preferences and beliefs about collective preferences of physical attractiveness. In the first
round, participants vote their 3 favorite ladies; in the second round they vote the 3 ladies they
believe were the most voted in the first round.Unlike other beauty contest experiments, our
setup does not investigate depth of reasoning in a cognitively intense task. Instead, it is meant
to investigate the existence of shared definitions of physical attractiveness, and whether these
may be successfully employed as focal points.Our results show that most participants hold
mistaken beliefs about collective preferences and overestimate and underestimate how well
liked certain ladies are. Regardless of these mistakes, the winning portraits win by a wide
margin in both rounds. Moreover, our participants are better at predicting the portraits which
will not be the most voted than those which will.
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The judgment of taste […] is not a cognitive judgment, and 
so not logical, but is aesthetic – which means it is one 
whose determining ground cannot be other than subjective. 
- Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgement 
 
1. Introduction 
Economists  do  not  care  as  much  as  our  colleagues  in  Mathematics  and  Natural 
Sciences whether our models and theories are aesthetically beautiful (Lee & Lloyd 
2005), but we care a lot for the attractiveness of our colleagues and, when we vote for 
Vice Presidents and members of the Executive Committee of the American Economic 
Association,  we  end  up  choosing  the  candidates  with  better-looking  pictures  
(Hamermesh  2006).
1  This  is  hardly  surprising:  voters  possess  little  political 
information and may select candidates based on their personal characteristics rather 
than on their political agenda (Downs 1957, Bartels 1996) with the consequence that 
the attractiveness of a politician is a well-known predictor of her electoral success 
(e.g. Todorov et al. 2005, Berggren et al. 2007). 
Beside the AEA ballots, another way in which beauty entered economics is as the 
research  agenda  of  what  we  may  call  the  ‘economics  of  beauty,’  which  is  now 
becoming  an  established  field.  In  a  seminal  paper  that  appeared  in  the  American 
Economic Review, Daniel Hamermesh and  Jeff Biddle (1994) revealed how looks 
constitute  a  basis  for  discrimination  in  labor  markets.  They  show  that  a  veritable 
“plainness penalty” and a “beauty premium” exist, which make it more likely for 
attractive individuals to be hired and promoted, and to earn higher wages than average 
and unattractive colleagues. Both the penalty and the premium may be large: Chinese 
women in Shanghai earn 24.6% lower hourly wages if their appearance is below-
average, while young American men may expect a 10.1% bonus if their looks are 
above-average  (see  also:  Frieze  et  al.  1991,  Marlowe  et  al.  1996,  Biddle  & 
Hamermesh 1998, Hamermesh et al. 2000, Harper 2000). In general, the penalties are 
larger than the premia. These high penalties make it even more advantageous for 
below-average-looking young males to engage in crime rather than entering regular 
jobs (Mocan & Tekin 2005). 
One explanation that has been proposed for this phenomenon is that schoolteachers 
seem to have low expectations about the performance of plain-looking children, while 
they give preferential treatment to better-looking ones (Hatfield & Sprecher 1986), 
which arguably translate in less human capital formation for the less beautiful (Mocan 
& Tekin 2005, Mobius & Rosenblat 2006). While it is far from clear why teachers 
would  have  differential  expectations  about  their  pupils  based  on  looks,  if  such 
differential existed, it would arguably be discriminatory. In some industries which 
require frequent interactions with customers, on the other hand, the penalty and the 
premium are probably associated with productivity-differentials – as seems the case 
for advertising firms (Pfann et al. 2000) and even for teaching (Hamermesh & Parker 
2004) – and may thus not be truly discriminatory. In a cross-sectional investigation, 
however, the intensity of customer interactions fails to explain the beauty premium 
(Hamermesh & Biddle 1994). It has been experimentally shown, moreover, that good-
looking participants are (wrongly) believed to be more skilled at a maze-solving task 
unrelated to physical attractiveness (Mobius & Rosenblat 2006). 
Why  does  beauty  affect  our  perception  of  others?  A  pro-beauty  bias  may  be 
evolutionarily  sound,  because  attractiveness  may  signal  physical  health  or  higher 
intelligence  (Jackson  et  al.  1995,  Langlois  et  al.  2000).  Since  both  are  important 
                                                 
1 We use (physical/aesthetic) attractiveness/pleasantness as synonyms of beauty throughout the article.   2 
aspects  of  mate  quality  (Andersson  1994),  the  skill  to  detect  beauty  is  fitness 
improving, which may explain why most people recognize it and agree on what is 
beautiful (Langlois et al. 2000). Also, what is considered physically attractive is fairly 
stable over time, at least within a culture (Hamermesh & Biddle 1994: 1175ff.). 
In this paper we regard beauty as a coordination device, in the footsteps of focal 
points, for an experimental task which could not be more aptly labeled: a beauty 
contest. 
 
2. Economics and Beauty Contests 
In one of the most famous passages in the economic literature of all times, John 
Maynard  Keynes  (1936,  p.  156)  likened  the  investment  in  the  stock  market  by 
professional traders 
to  those  newspaper  competitions  in  which  the  competitors  have  to  pick  out  the  six 
prettiest faces from a hundred photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor 
whose choice most nearly corresponds to the average preferences of the competitors as a 
whole […] It is not a case of choosing those which, to the best of one’s judgement, are 
really the prettiest, nor even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. 
We have reached the third degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating what 
average opinion expects the average opinion to be. 
Experimental  beauty  contest  are  well  established  in  the  economics  literature  (e.g. 
Nagel  1995,  Ho  et  al.  1998,  Güth  et  al.  2002).  These  experiments  require  the 
participants to choose a real number from a closed interval, e.g. I [0,100]. Whoever 
picks the number closest to p times the average (usually with 0 < p < 1) is the winner 
of a monetary reward. An experiment like this is dominance solvable: the process of 
iterated elimination of dominated strategies leads to the unique and stable equilibrium 
at  which  every  player  chooses  zero.  The  simplest  strategy  would  be  to  choose  a 
random  number (zero-order  belief).  A  more  elaborate  strategy  is  to form  a  (first-
order) belief on the choices of the others and play accordingly. If everybody else 
chose at random, for instance, a player would win by choosing p times the mean (i.e. 
50). Therefore all players should choose p • 50. Yet, if that were the case, one would 
win by choosing p
2 • 50, which is the second-order belief on the first-order beliefs of 
others… and so on until the n
th-order (with n  ∞) belief at which the equilibrium 
value is reached, p
n • 50 = 0, and all players win. 
It is curious that these experiments are labeled beauty contests, since they do not 
deal  with  one’s  own  versus  average  preferences  but  with  a  cognitively  intense 
exercise. In other words the skill at play is not the prediction of aesthetic tastes, but 
the calculative inferential skills required to understand the structure of a  complex 
game theoretical setting (Lanteri & Carabelli 2008). Whereas in these experiments a 
truly  omniscient  player  could  in  principle  be  the  sole  winner  by  picking  the 
appropriate p•avg number (note that such number would also influence the average), 
in an actual beauty contest even an omniscient player could be the winner only insofar 
as he voted with the largest crowd, in a way that is rather reminiscent of a focal point 
in coordination games (e.g. Schelling 1980). Experimental beauty contests become 
coordination games of this kind in the case of p = 1, where each player must simply 
guess the average. Such case, too, allows in principle multiple equilibria: if everybody 
chose 1 (or 2, or 29, or 84) or any other number, then that number would also be the 
winning number (though we suspect that there would be a very strong focal point at 
number 50). When designed in this way, however, an experimental beauty contest 
would better be labeled ‘guessing game’ (as experimental beauty contests have been 
customarily called until the mid-90’s), since the subjects would really have to make a 
guess. Such guess, moreover, would certainly not reveal much about any difference   3 
between individual and collective aesthetic preferences. We therefore chose to design 
an experiment that differs significantly from those mentioned above. 
Our interest in beauty contests and in beauty at large is due to the fact that the 
capacity to make accurate predictions of average opinions and preferences is a useful 
social skill, with major economic consequences. Although individual preferences are 
heterogeneous, aggregate preferences are much less so: global markets are winner-
take-all (Frank & Cook 1995) arenas, wherein an expert investor capable of predicting 
a stock-market fad, a fashion designer who brings out the ultimate handbag which 
every lady would die for, or a writer who drafts a novel all kids love… all make a 
killing and cash in a fortune. It becomes therefore interesting to investigate whether 
these successes reflect mere luck or people have the capacity to predict the aggregate 
preferences of others. 
As mentioned, we designed an altogether novel (yet very much traditional) beauty 
contest experiment to investigate the gap between genuine individual opinions and the 
average opinion of a population, as well as the capacity of individuals to predict the 
average preferences of the population of which they are members. We shall therefore 
present the results of an experiment that more closely maps onto the structure of a 
beauty contest in its lay meaning of selecting the most beautiful (or that believed to be 
considered  the  most  beautiful)  lady.  After  expressing  their  individual  votes,  the 
participants in our experiment must vote again, this time coordinating their choice of 
three ladies, while employing beauty as a focal point of sorts. 
 
3. The experiment 
On the 8
th November 2007, we recruited 71 students of Law at the University of 
Eastern Piedmont in Alessandria (Italy). At the beginning, all the subjects were given 
a legal disclaimer, the instructions, the answer sheets and a separate page with high-
quality color portraits of some ladies selected from the participants of an international 
beauty contest (e.g. FIGURE 1). 
To ensure internal validity, we wanted to rule out the risk that some subjects had 
seen the ladies before experiment day. We thus excluded the contestants from Miss 
Italy and chose instead those from the Miss World pageant. Moreover, since aesthetic 
preferences are affected by fashions and trends, we wanted pictures that were quite 
recent. On the other hand they needed to be not too recent, so to again reduce the 
probability that the subjects who had seen the girls before could remember them. 
When they take part in a real world beauty contest, the contestants are assessed 
along a variety of characteristics (e.g. personality, talent, beauty, etc.) by a jury, which 
sees them repeatedly and has several occasions to comment on their merits. Because it 
would have been impractical, alas, to summon all the ladies in person, our subjects 
merely voted for a picture. In spite of the obvious differences, we also wanted to 
secure a chance to compare the votes cast by our subjects with the ranking of the 
actual contest.
2 As of 2004, the Miss World voting system changed to include the 
preferences  expressed  by  the  TV  viewers  of  the  finals.  The  heterogeneity  of  this 
extended jury and its bias in voting make it a poor standard of comparison. It thus 
seemed best to employ the contestants from the 2003 edition. 
We were careful to keep the number of portraits manageable, so that the subjects 
could easily compare them. We decided against using all of 106 misses and instead 
limited our selection to 36, so that their portraits could all be fitted on a single page 
                                                 
2 Many beauty queens pursue a career in modelling (and specifically in photo modelling) and conversely many photo models 
participate  in  some  beauty  contest,  so  there  must  exist  some  close  relationship  between  the  skills  and  qualities  that  make 
someone a successful beauty contestant and those that make her look good on pictures.   4 
and remain clearly distinguishable. In order to reduce the risk of some participants 
knowing some of the pageants beforehand and to rule out (as far as possible) any bias 
that such previous exposure may cause, we deliberately excluded from our selection 
the Irish contestant, who won the title, the Italian, Albanian, and Moroccan ones, 
because some of the participants in the experiment were nationals of those countries.
3 
The  portraits  were  arranged  within  a  grid  with  six  rows  (identified  with  the 
numbers from 1 to 6) and six columns (identified with the letters from A to F). In 
order to reduce positioning effects, we employed four different grids, each with a 
unique randomized distribution of portraits. For each grid, therefore, each portrait had 
a unique code, composed of one letter and one number, corresponding to its position 
in the grid (e.g. A-6, G-3, etc.). 
 
3.1. The treatments 
The experimental procedure took place as follows:
4 in the first round, the subjects 
were asked to vote their three favorite portraits (i.e. express their first-order beliefs), 
which we call INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES round. We then collected their answer sheets 
and distributed a new questionnaire in which they were asked to list the three portraits 
they  believed  had  been  most  voted  by  the  others  (i.e.  their  second-order  beliefs), 
which  we  call  MOST  VOTED  round.  This  gives  us  174  votes  for  each  round.  The 
participants knew that correctly indicating the single most voted portraits would let 
them enter a raffle for a monetary prize (€ 15). The entire experiment took less than 
30 minutes. 
We also arranged for 24 people (12 of each gender) to express an INDEPENDENT 
RATING of the beauty of six portraits (i.e. express their first-order beliefs), reproduced 
on a smaller portrait sheets (e.g. FIGURE 2), so that each sheet was rated on a 1 to 10 
scale by two male and two female raters. The independent raters were selected among 
our acquaintances, reached through their personal e-mails, and were not paid. We 
estimate that each devoted roughly three to five minutes fulfilling their task. 
 
4. Results and discussion 
The results from the standard treatment are reported in TABLE I. In both rounds we 
observe  a  strong  winner-take-all  effect  (i.e.  the  winning  portraits  win  by  a  wide 
margin): the top 4 ladies in the INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES round received 68 votes, in 
the MOST  VOTED round the effect is even more marked: the top 4 ladies obtain 82 
votes, in both rounds the least voted ladies received 0 votes. We thus observe greater 
dispersion in the second round. The Gini coefficient is .58 in the first round and .65 in 
the second round and the most voted now takes almost all the possible votes now.
5 
On average, in the second turn participants change 1.75 of the 3 portraits chosen in 
the first turn. The chi-squared test shows that the INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES and the 
MOST VOTED distributions are significantly different at the 99% level of confidence 
(when  we  included  the  portraits  with  less  than  5  total  votes,  the  test  remains 
significant, see notes to Table 1). The difference in vote distributions shows that the 
participants are aware of a gap between individual and collective preferences, that 
they are capable of a split-judgment, and that they consequently modify their answers.  
What about accuracy? In the MOST VOTED round, we predicted a strong clustering 
of  votes.  The  least  voted  portraits,  for  example,  should  be  left  at  zero.  Indeed, 
eighteen of the ladies received either 0 or 1 votes in the second round, and fifteen of 
                                                 
3 We dropped the responses from the one participant who correctly identified the contest from which the misses were taken. 
4 Full instructions are available from the corresponding author. 
5 If we limit the analysis to the top 24 observations of each round, so that we avoid the 0’s, the coefficients are .42 and .49.   5 
these were also the least voted in the first round. This confirms that our subjects were 
quite good at voting out the ladies they believed to be sure losers. 
Accuracy, however, was much poorer when it came to identifying the top-voted 
portraits. The podium in the INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES round (miss Curacao with 19 
votes, miss Georgia with 18, and miss Switzerland with 16) received 53 votes. This is 
the  target  first-order  judgment  and  we  predicted  those  three  ladies  to  win  by  a 
landslide in the second round. They didn’t. In the MOST VOTED round, the same ladies 
receive only 44 votes (Curacao: 12, Georgia: 11, Switzerland: 21). Contrary to our 
expectations, in the second round, the dispersion of votes for the most voted ladies 
increases: the Gini coefficient for the top-4 misses is .05 in the first round and .25 in 
the second round. 
In the second round we note two clear patterns: the overestimation of the votes 
received by some portraits and the underestimation of others. This is what we hoped 
for, as it is obviously what we would observe if everybody voted for the correct top-3 
misses. Our data, however, are less comforting.
6 Two examples show our point. 
* In the first round, miss Hungary came in 4
th, with 15 votes. In the second round, 
she only received 8 votes. This is especially striking in comparison with miss Brazil, 
who also was 4
th in the first round with 15 votes. In the second round, however, miss 
Brazil was by far the most voted with 37 votes. 
* Miss Curacao, the winner of the INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES round with 19 votes, 
scaled down to 12 in the MOST VOTED round. The same result as miss Belarus, who 
had only received 3 votes in the first round. 
When looking at the INDEPENDENT RATING results (TABLE II), we again find that 
the lowest twenty portraits (i.e. those with an average rating below 7/10) correspond 
to portraits that received very few votes in both INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES and MOST 
VOTED  rounds,  with  the  exception  of  the  misses  from  Aruba,  Bolivia,  and  South 
Africa. It is at the top of the ranking, however, that we observe unexpected results. 
Half of the highest rated ladies, including the top two, had received few votes in the 
standard  treatment.  Conversely,  the  winners  of  the  standard  treatment  had  a 
performance below our expectations. 
The participants in our experiments systematically relegate some portraits in the 
bottom  and  some  in  the  top  positions,  which  induces  us  to  believe  that  they  are 
capable both of identifying beauty (and lack thereof) and of predicting what others 
identify as beauty (and lack thereof). They are, however, not consistent in ranking it. 
In other words, there is a broad, but rough, agreement that some Miss X and Miss Y 
are beautiful, and that some Miss Z is not so. There is, however, hardly any agreement 
on whether Miss X is more or less beautiful than Miss Y. This is the problem which 
ultimately undermines participants’ performance in our experiment. 
There  is  no  visual-aesthetic  clue  (e.g.  color  of  hair,  eyes,  and  skin,  hairstyle, 
geographical origin, position in the grid, etc.) that proves especially salient or that 
prevails as a coordinating focal point. Consequently, there are no features that predict 
which portraits are considered beautiful, believed to be considered beautiful by the 
others, underestimated or overestimated. Both the ladies who received more votes in 
the in the INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES round and those who received more in the MOST 
VOTED round display a broad variety of features.
7 
                                                 
6 Perhaps the misses relate differently to what participants believe to be the stereotypical canons of beauty, but it was not possible 
to investigate this hypothesis with our data. 
7 The tests are available from the corresponding author. At the end of the experiment, the participants were requested to comment 
on their choices and on the reasons that moved them to prefer some ladies to the others. The answers proved of limited practical 
use since, for instance, the two most common answers were: ‘I voted for the prettiest (or synonym) ladies’ and ‘I voted for the 
ladies I liked the most.’ Even the participants who gave one of two other very common responses – i.e. they voted for the ladies   6 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
The skill to predict average opinions is valuable, because it makes it easier to navigate 
most social contexts. Also the capacity to recognize beauty is important. Attractive 
traits (e.g. averageness and symmetry) may signal important aspects of mate quality 
(Andersson  1994)  and  recognizing  them  seems  a  fitness-enhancing  skill.  If  this 
evolutionary account is true, it may be even more important to guard oneself from – 
hence  discriminate  against  –  poorly  looking  people,  as  this  may  signal  genetic 
makeup of a low quality.
8 Both these skills are important, moreover, because they 
have large economic consequences. 
There exists a veritable “beauty premium” that makes it more likely for attractive 
individuals to be hired, promoted, and to earn higher wages than their colleagues and 
an even larger “plainness penalty” that makes it more likely for unattractive people to 
earn low wages, even when any difference in actual performance is either lacking or, 
if present, it is not large enough to warrant the difference in pay. It is probable that the 
advantages given to the beautiful people, if unfair, are not aware and deliberate. Even 
if someone wanted to hire the best looking person or the person he thinks others will 
find  as  the  best  looking,  our  experiment  shows  that  this  might  not  be  very  easy. 
Therefore,  perhaps  the  pro-beauty  discrimination  may  be  a  less  prevalent 
phenomenon than one would be lead to believe from the existing literature. 
Both the poor performance of our subjects with respect to the most voted ladies 
and the good performance at finding the least voted ones are therefore of interest.
9 
Perhaps there were too many girls to choose from or they were all too consistently 
beautiful.
10 While recognizing beauty and lack thereof may be evolutionary useful, 
there  seems  to  exist  no  comparable  advantage  in  being  capable  of  coordinating 
through  beauty  or  to  predict  other  people’s  aesthetic  tastes.  This  is  probably  a 
consequence of our having different ideals of beauty and aesthetic tastes, which may 
be fitness increasing, because it reduces the competition for the same partners. 
In  the  past,  psychological  and  economic  research  has  shown  that,  although 
aesthetical pleasantness is a many-layered trait, members of both genders and from 
different  cultures  generally  agree  on  attractiveness.
11  Our  research  exposes  some 
limitations to such agreement: the participants in our study do not seem to agree very 
much, and they seem to give credit to Kant’s observation that the determining factors 
of beauty are ultimately subjective. 
 
                                                                                                                                           
with the nicest smile or with the most natural look – gave very heterogeneous votes. Since these comments do not affect the 
payoff, most subjects seemed especially lazy at this stage. Therefore, on other occasions, at the end of different treatments and 
with different subjects, we conducted oral debriefing sessions instead. These, too, proved of limited help. 
8 This might explain why the plainness penalty is larger than the beauty premium. 
9 However, we do not know whether ranking at the bottom would be more accurate, since we did not ask them to rank the least 
beautiful portraits. 
10 Having been voted as one of the 20 winners in the actual contest does not predict the votes received in our experiment. 
11 Also in our experiment there were no significant differences between the votes of men and women.   7 




FIGURE 2. Smaller Portraits Sheet (one of six). 
 
 
   8 
TABLE I. Results, Standard Treatment 
(I) 
 
Miss  Ind. Pref.  Most Voted  Miss  Ind. Pref.  Most Voted 
Aruba  6  6  India (*)  6  4 
Australia (*)  6  6  Jamaica (*)  4  0 
Bahamas  0  0  Japan  0  0 
Barbados  0  0  Kazakhstan  0  0 
Belarus  3  12  Namibia  1  1 
Bolivia (*)  7  7  Nigeria  0  0 
Brazil  15  37  Nicaragua  1  2 
Cayman Islands  0  0  Puerto Rico (*)  4  3 
Costa Rica  1  3  Poland  6  1 
China (*)  4  0  Singapore  3  1 
Curacao  19  12  SerbiaMontenegro  1  1 
Dominican R. (*)  3  7  South Africa  5  9 
Ethiopia (*)  0  1  Sweden  1  5 
France  7  6  Switzerland (*)  16  21 
Georgia (*)  18  11  Uruguay  14  8 
Guadeloupe  2  0  Uganda  1  1 
Hungary  15  8  Zambia  2  0 
Israel  1  0  Zimbabwe  2  1 
      TOTAL  174  174 
(I): Ⱥ
2 = 48.688 (p-value = .012). Note that the portraits with 0 votes both in the INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES and in the 
MOST VOTED treatments have been dropped from the test. We also performed a test aggregating all the portraits which 
received less than 5 votes in total (adding together INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES and MOST VOTED), which is significant. 
(*): indicates a contestant who was voted as the recipient of one of 20 prizes in the actual contest. 
 
TABLE II. Average Rating, INDEPENDENT RATERS 
 
Dominican R.  9.75  Costa Rica  6.75 
Hungary  8.75  South Africa  6.75 
France  8.25  Namibia  6.5 
Switzerland  8  Jamaica  6.5 
India  8  SerbiaMontenegro  6.5 
China  8  Zambia  6.5 
Georgia  8  Guadeloupe  6.5 
Puerto Rico  7.75  Ethiopia  6.25 
Uruguay  7.75  Nicaragua  6.25 
Australia  7.75  Zimbabwe  6.25 
Curacao  7.75  Bahamas  6.25 
Brazil  7.5  Bolivia  6 
Poland  7.25  Kazakhstan  6 
Nigeria  7.25  Barbados  6 
Singapore  7.25  Israel  6 
Belarus  7.25  Cayman Island  5.75 
Aruba  6.75  Japan  5.75   9 
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